Adolescents who are actively requesting Huntington's predictive testing of their own accord pose a dilemma to those providing testing. In the absence of empirical evidence as regards the impact of genetic testing on minors, current policy and guidelines, based on the ethical principles of non-maleficence and respect for individual autonomy and confidentiality, generally exclude the testing of minors. It is argued that adherence to an age based exclusion criterion in Huntington's disease predictive testing protocols is out of step with trends in UK case law concerning minors' consent to medical treatment. Furthermore, contributions from developmental psychology and research into adolescents' decision making competence suggest that adolescents can make informed choices about their health and personal lives. Criteria for developing an assessment approach to such requests are put forward and the implications of a case by case evaluation of competence to consent in terms of clinicians' tolerance for uncertainty are discussed. (J3Med Genet 1996;33:912-918) In three of these cases, the adolescent initiated the request and subsequently declined testing.
In response to recent requests for HD predictive testing, we have been prompted to reconsider our clinical practice in relation to testing of people under the age of 18. Most of the debate surrounding HD predictive testing of minors has focused on the predicament posed by third party/parental requests and the pros and cons of testing at such a young age.Ì t is a different issue that we wish to address in this article, namely the dilemma posed by adolescents who are actively requesting HD predictive testing of their own accord. A survey of applications for linkage testing from four major European Community testing centres (in Belgium, Italy, The Netherlands, and UK) showed that five out of 39 referrals under 18 years of age were self-referrals, as opposed to requests made by parents or professionals.5
That the majority of referrals of minors came from the Cardiff series (n=29) may be explained by the possibility that comparable referrals to other centres were filtered out at an early stage. Examining the Cardiff series in more detail, it is notable that 12 of the 29 referrals involved teenagers with a mean age of 15.5 years (A Tyler, personal communication). In three of these cases, the adolescent initiated the request and subsequently declined testing. best absorbed slowly and when the moment is right rather than during a crisis over pregnancy") could be applied equally to adult onset conditions. We recognise, however, that there are varying degrees of disclosure and that these findings do not, in themselves, support predictive genetic testing at an early age. Outside the field of genetic screening and testing, empirical evidence suggests that being informed of a serious illness at an early age may facilitate adjustment and coping. Wertz et al'7 report that "those who find out only in adulthood that a serious disorder such as HD exists in the family fare more poorly than those who know earlier". Adoption studies also support the psychological benefits of early disclosure. 7
The potential adverse effects of minors undergoing tests for their genetic status are well documented.817 Less attention has been paid to the psychological harm that may be caused by withholding genetic testing. 22 In this regard, Bloch et al23 comment that "the decision to postpone testing can never be taken lightly. The stress of undergoing testing, receiving a result, and adjusting to the new risk status must be weighed against the stress and uncertainty of living at risk for HD, the blow to the candidate's self-respect by being denied testing and the possible sense of humiliation and helplessness by having one's autonomy undermined". Indeed, psychological assessment of a cohort undergoing linkage testing showed that those receiving a test result fared better than those for whom the test was uninformative. 24 Michie'8 argues that practice should be based on empirical evidence, that it should not vary according to the subjective judgements of individual clinicians, and that policy decisions should also take account ofthe views ofparents, children, and the public. Clearly, there is a need for research to inform practice in this area by, for example, exploring the psychosocial impact of childhood genetic testing in disorders where the ethical difficulties inherent in testing for an untreatable, late onset disorder do not arise. Other suggested areas of research include widening the debate concerning childhood genetic testing to include the attitudes of parents and children; exploration of psychological effects (including the development of personality, coping styles, and defense mechanisms) on people, confronted in their childhood or adolescence with their personal risk for adult onset diseases; and controlled studies of the short and long term effects of testing, and the mediators of these effects.'925 (Coping styles are conscious, rational ways of dealing with the source of anxieties, as opposed to defense mechanisms, which are unconscious strategies, designed to deal with the anxiety itself, rather than its source.) In addition, the consequences of withholding testing need to be documented. 26 Despite the dearth of evidence conceming the impact of childhood genetic testing, there is a considerable body of publications that addresses the issue of adolescents' capacity to make competent decisions about their health and personal lives. Evidence from the law concerning consent to medical treatment, developmental psychology, and research concerning adolescent decision making presents a counterargument to the exclusion of under 18 year olds on the basis of their inability to make informed decisions about predictive testing. make a choice will be able to give a valid consent even if they have not reached the statutory age. Therefore, the law supports an assessment, rather than an age based exclusion, approach as regards informed consent by minors.
The central issue is degree of intellectual and emotional maturity (sufficient understanding) rather than age. The problem arises in defining precisely what is required by way of understanding. It has been suggested that legal capacity must be determined in accordance with the particular decision in question so that the more serious the choice, the greater the understanding that is required. '7 In this regard, the courts have recognised that, where possible, irreversible decisions should be left for children to make when they reach maturity.9 Considering the rapidly changing case law surrounding consent to medical treatment, Montgomery9 concludes that "it remains unclear how much a client must be able to understand to consent to the investigation of their genetic status".
Defining decision making competence The abandonment of a strictly age based exclusion criterion requires the development of strategies for individual assessment. Such assessment needs to be based on some consensus regarding the key components of decision making competence. Definitions of this competence, however, vary considerably. For example, an ethicist's understanding of competence, which includes the capacity to have and apply a set ofvalues, diverges from a purely legal standard. ' Within psychosocial research, conceptions of competence span a broad spectrum from a narrow information processing perspective, to skills based approaches, to a view of social decision making as a complex process that it is affected by many other factors besides intellectual capacity.
Early Challenging the "individualised" perspective of early developmental theorists is the view that competence needs to be defined, and only has meaning, with reference to the social, cultural, and institutional context. "Competence is more than a skill; it is a way of relating, and can be understood more clearly when each child's inner qualities are seen within a network of relationships and cultural influences".30 This approach argues that the development of competence is influenced by factors external to the person, such as parental attitudes and expectations, the state of medicine, the law, and the media, all of which are instrumental in forming a conception of children's abilities, rights, and responsibilities. Current conceptions of childhood and adolescence have an effect on both the development of competence and the way in which it is assessed. For example, children's competence would be enhanced where parents see them as responsible and trustworthy, informing them and involving them in decision making. Conversely, competence would be inhibited where parents adopt a controlling or protective stance toward their children, withholding information from them. Features of the clinical setting in which testing takes place could hinder adolescents' capacity to make competent decisions by, for example, a lack of space to sit and talk quietly. 30 Judgements about decision making competence could be influenced by health professionals' attitudes towards the procedure, their perceptions of the risks and benefits involved, their levels of knowledge, and their tolerance for uncertainty. Research has shown that clinicians' practices regarding genetic testing are significantly correlated with their tolerance for ambiguity (ambiguity being interpreted as a type of uncertainty that cannot be represented by numerical probabilities).3' Health professionals, including medical geneticists, with low ambiguity tolerance were less likely to offer a new, low cost, accurate predictive test in the scenario of no others in their specialty offering the test. In addition, Geller et alP note that low tolerance for. ambiguity has been associated with paternalistic medical practices and not giving the patient autonomy in clinical decisions.
Much of the research concerning decision making in the context of risk is underpinned by normative theories of decision making, which prescribe ways of analysing and making decisions on rational information processing grounds. There is, however, widespread agreement that these models are inadequate in describing how people actually make decisions, hence the current interest in descriptive or naturalistic models of decision making.32 The shortcomings of systematic information processing models of decision making are particularly apparent in the context of genetic related decisions where people have to make choices based on probabilistic outcomes and in a context of much uncertainty. One of the few studies exploring how people actually made decisions related to genetic risk33 shows that decisional processes are not in accordance with normative decision making theories but are characterised by heuristic information processing. It '9 conclude that "research has found children to be quite competent to learn decision making skills and to take control over decision making about their own health, especially when the scope of decision making is clearly defined". Korer and Fitzsimmons36, in their study of young people in HD families, concluded that "the young people concerned seemed able to discuss HC and its implications in a rational and thoughtful manner" and that "there is no evidence to support the supposition that young people are too emotionally volatile to cope with information about HC".
The capacity for adolescent competence in decision making is apparent but whether or not adolescents exploit this capacity is constrained or facilitated by a number of factors.
Psychological and social constraints to competent decision making in adolescence Psychologically, adolescence can be viewed as a period of transition: a stage in the family life cycle where the person's task can be described as exploring and developing identity characteristics of the self different from the parents. It is a time of experimentation with new roles and fluctuation of values.'7 A failure to weight the future adequately and to realise that values change over time has been noted as a problem of adolescent decision making.'7 Peer pressure to conform (which is a threat to autonomous decision making) is strongest in early adolescence, before the age of 15.29 Research findings concerning 14 to 15 year olds asked to make decisions in hypothetical medical dilemmas that included varying degrees of parental influence suggest that adolescents generally defer to perceived parental wishes.37 However, Sherer and Reppucci37 also note that the effect of parental influence varies according to the situation, with adolescents being "more likely to resist parental influence when the consequences or gravity of the decision has serious implications for the adolescent's health".
Adolescents may experience an external locus of control, perceiving other people, or events, as controlling them."' This presents a threat to "decision control" (or willingness to choose), another hallmark of mature, competent decision making which is related to having an internal locus of control (holding the view that one is responsible for one's own actions and has control over one's destiny) and high self-esteem. 29 Family structure and functioning have an important influence on adolescents' involvement and confidence in personal decision making, with decision making capacities being under used where adolescents do not perceive themselves as having choices in the first place. Furthermore, family dynamics characterised by conflict and low cohesion have been shown to limit adolescents' involvement in decision making.29
An assessment approach towards adolescent predictive testing requests There seems to be a precedent in the case law surrounding consent to medical treatment for adopting an assessment, rather than an exclusion, approach in determining minors' competence to consent to predictive testing.
According to the General Medical Council Guidelines, it is the clinician's duty to make judgements about a child's level of understanding and maturity and to act accordingly.38
The geneticist then has discretion as to the particular time when information should be disclosed and studies from the Canadian Collaborative Study of HD Predictive Testing advocate that psychiatric and psychological assessment should be undertaken to determine the patient's readiness to proceed with predictive testing.39 Such assessment has not performed a gate keeping role, apart from the need to exclude the presence of serious psychiatric illness or suicidal risk in test applicants. Rather, psychiatric and psychological assessment has served to identify factors predictive of coping responses and has guided the planning of appropriate psychosocial support. Evaluation of the HD predictive testing protocol has been in terms of changes in the quality of life and psychosocial status of test applicants at follow up. As when HD predictive testing was first offered to adults, we advocate that assessment and testing of adolescents be carried out within the framework of a research protocol that documents their psychosocial status on requesting testing and at regular intervals following disclosure of the test result, as well as the assessment process itself.
Assessment of adolescents' cognitive competence and emotional maturity is arguably beyond the scope of a clinical geneticist. There are, however, professionals with expertise in this area who, for example, are called upon to assess children's decision making competence in child custody cases. We would therefore advocate the involvement of a child/adolescent clinical psychologist/psychiatrist during the assessment process.
Commenting on the testing protocol put forward by the UK Huntington's Prediction Consortium, Tyler and It is arguable that self-selection (on the basis of good psychological functioning and positive appraisals of coping abilities) will operate in adolescent predictive testing requests as it has with adults.45"7 Furthermore, Kessler46 suggests that the HD predictive testing protocol may act as a screen to discourage all but the most motivated and determined people to proceed. We do, however, acknowledge that findings as regards the characteristics of the new cohort undergoing mutation testing suggest that they may not have the same levels of psychological adjustment and social support as seen with the linked marker cohort. 48 Genetic testing is an area of medicine that presents both clinicians and patients with much uncertainty. New technologies create the possibility for a greater number of genetic diseases to be predicted, with varying degrees of certainty. "As technical knowledge expands, so does the power of the geneticist to influence the lives of clients who seek counselling about their own genetic status or the status of their children. In this developing context, the geneticist may experience most vividly the contrast between the beneficent care giver and the client whose autonomy must be respected".6 The abandonment of "protectionist" policies in favour of adopting an assessment approach to adolescent predictive testing requests will require reliance on the clinical skill of appropriately trained professionals, rather than predetermined values and rigid exclusion criteria. We recognise that this would present a challenge to clinicians' tolerance for uncertainty. It is possible that the stringent pretest protocol serves not only to prepare and support test applicants, but also to reassure clinicians when faced with the many unpredictable aspects of patients' responses to genetic information. We would not, however, advocate enforcing rigid exclusion criteria and agree that "flexibility rather than immutable protocol in predictive testing programs better allows patients to receive the services they want and need" ." 
